were once assured. The negative economic impact of the ITAR has permitted foreign companies and governments to enter markets that were previously not competitively open to them. As the U.S. commercial satellite market share continues to erode, the U.S. risks losing technical dominance, thereby negatively impacting national security.
This paper examines the theory and history behind export controls and the current United States export control system, the regulations implemented to enforce the export control system and the negative national security implications of the ITAR.
Seven recommendations to "fix the ITAR" are proposed in an effort to preserve U.S.
space industry superiority as is consistent with the dictates of the U.S. National Security Strategy..
THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
The United States currently faces unprecedented threats to its security both at home and abroad. In confronting these threats, we must be able to exploit the full advantage we derive from our economic strength and technological prowess.
To that end, the U.S. export control system must be modernized so that it is better able to respond quickly and effectively to evolving security threats, and promote our nation's continued economic and technological leadership.
-Coalition for Security and Competitiveness
Export control systems serve several important national security functions. They prevent critical military and defense technologies from falling into the wrong hands, they can create and help preserve economic and technology leadership, and they can be useful tools to implement cooperation and sharing amongst allies thereby improving collective security. Controlling exports, and in particular defense trade exports, through a rigorous export control system is more than a mere regulatory function; it is an important element of most nations' foreign policies and is a critical element of the United
States' national security policy.
The Current United States Export Control System
There is a decades-old, ongoing debate in the United States over the proper export control authority for satellite technology. In particular, the question is whether commercial communication satellites (often referred to as "comsats") and the underlying satellite manufacturing technology should be controlled by the Bureau of Industry and To complicate the export situation further, in 1995 and 1996, two U.S. satellites were destroyed during Chinese launches. Actions taken after the disasters served as the impetus for certain members of Congress to further restrict satellite export policy and to subject satellite technology exports to increased scrutiny. After the launch failures, the Chinese and the U.S. satellite manufacturers conducted joint failure analyses in an effort to determine causation. In part, these failure investigation reports were needed to satisfy the U.S. companies' insurance carriers' requirements before the U.S. companies could be reimbursed for the destroyed satellites.
While Commerce approved the transfer of the technical data by the U.S.
companies to the Chinese, solely for failure investigation review purposes, the State Department objected to release of the data arguing that: 1) Commerce did not have the authority to grant the technical data transfer license without going through the multiagency review process and securing prior approval; and, 2) the data could subsequently be used by the Chinese to improve their ballistic missile capabilities. As a result of the "unauthorized" disclosure of technical data to the Chinese, three U.S. companies, Boeing (which had subsequently purchased Hughes, the company involved in 1995 and 1996), Lockheed Martin and Space Systems/ Loral agreed to pay fines totaling $65 million dollars. 25 In response to these perceived lapses and the apparent inability of the In furtherance of these goals, and in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 , President Bush issued a new National Security Strategy of the United States (the "NSS"). 29 While the National Security Strategy is a grand strategy document-by its very nature broad and all encompassing-it does specifically address the issue of both preserving America's technological advantages while encouraging and advocating the future development of technology. In the National Security Strategy introductory letter, President Bush states, "We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies." 30 Certainly the ITAR helps prevent acquisition of leading U.S. technology by our enemies, but to date, we have spent very little time "cooperating with other nations," a policy that has hindered sharing technology with our friends and has forced even our allies to develop their own competing space and satellite capabilities.
While preventing the acquisition of current technology by U.S. adversaries is a primary goal of the ITAR, the National Security Strategy recognizes that defense trade technology is not a static field and that the U.S. must be actively and dynamically involved in future development in order to retain technology leadership. "Investing in future capabilities while working to protect them through a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence capabilities" 31 is an important goal of the NSS.
U.S. National Space Policy
The U.S. National Space Policy is one of several subordinate national policies that provide implementing guidance to achieve the overarching goals of the U.S.
National Security Strategy. The President issued the current National Space Policy in 2006, and it represents a dramatic shift in focus from the prior U.S. National Space Policy. 32 In the Principles section of the Policy, the U.S. remains "committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity." "Consistent with this principle, 'peaceful purposes' allow U.S.
defense and intelligence related activities in pursuit of national interests." 33 The Policy makes a very strong statement about the United States' right to use space in any manner that will advance its national security strategy:
The United States considers space capabilities-including the ground and space segments and supporting links-vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests. 34 In order to achieve these principles, the U.S. is "committed to encouraging and facilitating a growing and entrepreneurial U.S. commercial space sector" and sets forth several goals to facilitate growth in the U.S. commercial space sector:
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 Enable a dynamic, globally competitive domestic commercial space sector in order to promote innovation, strengthen U.S. leadership, and protect national, homeland, and economic security.
 Strengthen and maintain the U.S. space-related science, technology and industrial base. A robust science, technology, and industrial base is critical for U.S. space capabilities.
 Maintain a timely and responsive regulatory environment for licensing commercial space activities and pursuing commercial space objectives.
The ITAR, however, is currently administered in a manner that is impeding the goals set forth in the U.S. National Space Strategy.
Impact of the ITAR on the U.S. Space Industry Worldwide, the U.S. has long been seen as the leader in all technical aspects of space and satellite technology. Unfortunately, the ability of the U.S. to maintain a technological lead is directly related to the success of its commercial space market, and never has that market been so weak.
Before the shift in export control policy in 1999, the U.S. dominated the commercial satellite-manufacturing field with an average annual market share of 83 percent. Since then, market share has declined to less than 50 percent. 36 While the plummeting market share cannot be blamed solely on tightened export regulations, 37 they have surely played a significant part in the decline. 38 For example, since the change in export policy, "no Chinese satellite operator has chosen to purchase any satellite that is subject to U.S. export regulation and have instead selected European and Israeli suppliers," at an estimated loss to U.S. manufacturers of $2-3 billion."  At Boeing's El Segundo facility, employment has dropped to between 5,700 and 6,000 people from 9,000 when Hughes was purchased.
In addition, the ITAR has had such a negative economic impact on U.S. satellite manufacturers that they are increasingly wary of even bidding on certain foreign contracts. If they anticipate a certain level of ITAR problems, such as on Koreasat 5
with its dual civil and military uses, U.S. companies will often choose not to expend the bid and proposal money necessary to submit a competitive bid. 44 As a result, "U.S.
satellite manufacturers have lost somewhere between $2.5 and $6 billion since 1999 primarily due to ITAR regulations." Department, 55 its recommendations do not go far enough and, alone, will not save the U.S. space industry. The following recommendations, if implemented, will improve the export control system such that the U.S. is able to control and protect critical defense technologies but is not hindered in its ability to sell and export those commercial technologies that are not critical to our national defense and security. The desired end state is to preserve U.S. space industry superiority with an intended consequence of increased national security.
Return Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites To The Commerce Department
Given the statistics and data presented above, it almost goes without saying that removing commercial satellites from the United States Munitions List and returning them to Commerce Department oversight is the first step in correcting the U.S. export control system. Since 1999, when all satellites were placed on the USML and export control was returned to the State Department, the U.S. satellite industry has undergone a substantial and dramatic decline. Removing commercial satellites from the USML and returning them to EAR oversight at Commerce is the first necessary step in encouraging and supporting the U.S. industry's return to competitiveness.
Create A Procedure By Which Industry Can Get Timely Advisory Opinions
Individuals and businesses have long been able to seek pre-activity guidance (an Thus, industry is required to incur the expense to prepare a license application, submit it, and potentially wait months to learn whether the application will be accepted or rejected. If there is a problem with just one aspect of the license application, rather than asking the applicant to modify or correct the application, State will frequently either deny the application without explanation or return it without action. 57 Both outcomes are very expensive for the applicant, time consuming, and needlessly opaque. The defense industry wishes to comply with the regulations in the most expedient and efficient manner possible-these are, after all, for-profit businesses whose goal is to export quickly and accurately. An advisory opinion would greatly aid that goal by both assisting exporters to prepare proper and accurate applications initially and reducing State Department staff time in reviewing and returning inaccurate or improper applications.
Implement National Security Council Level Coordination of Export Policy
Because of the serious nature of export control-its ability to both improve and degrade national security-a senior level individual should be appointed with the authority to coordinate export policy across all relevant government agencies. This appointment should not reside within the State Department, the Commerce Department or any other agency that has export control responsibility. The recommended level of appointment is at the National Security Council because of the ability at that level to have oversight into not just the agencies and departments responsible for export control but to have input authority at the national security strategy level.
The State Department has attempted to create such a role by implementing the Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG). The purpose of the DTAG is to provide for regular consultation with U.S. defense industry exporters. The charter of the DTAG directs it to advise the State Department on its "support for and regulation of defense trade to help ensure that the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States continue to be protected and advanced while helping to reduce unnecessary impediments to legitimate exports…"
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The groups' efforts, while laudable, have failed to remedy the deficiencies in the current ITAR, or to prevent the continuing downward spiral of the U.S. satellite market.
A review of the DTAG published minutes finds few references to advocacy on behalf of U.S. satellite manufacturers or concerns about U.S. competitiveness, and even fewer recommended or implemented steps to staunch the declining U.S. commercial satellite market. 59 The benefit of creating such a new NSC-level position would be three-fold. First, the appointee would be the central point of contact for industry so that concerns and suggestions for improving the export control system could be centralized in an office that would have the authority to act and implement changes. Second, the official could harmonize the application of the various export control and defense practices so that they are more efficient and so that corporations have an increased level of visibility into the application of export requirements. Finally, this position would create policy and serve as an expert resource for Congress, government agencies, and industry.
Increase Funding for Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Staffing
The This is a critical choke point in the processing of licenses and agreements.
Because of the high demand for additional support, and the negative effect on processing times, funding must be provided to train and staff additional DDTC positions.
Funding for an additional ten to fifteen full-time military positions, at a cost of roughly $5 -$7 million per year, 64 would yield a dramatic improvement in processing times.
Additional staffing should also be considered for ombudsman-type positions to provide training to and interface with industry, to issue advisory opinions and to conduct postshipment verification audits. 65 The Coalition has also expressed a willingness to fund additional staff for other agencies that participate in the export control system. 66 This increased staffing recommendation is one that could be implemented quickly at little additional cost and which will have an immediate, positive effect.
Additional staff in these billets should focus on technologies that are currently needed in the field and ones that will increase our interoperability with our allies and supporters.
To the extent possible, officers so assigned should have a technical background, prior assignments that provide familiarity with systems likely to be exported, or Command assignments with extensive systems-level acquisition activity.
Develop a Licensing Triage Program to Separate Routine and Complex Applications
Currently there is no process in place at State or Commerce to triage applications. License and agreements are assigned and staffed as received. This permits routine applications to clog the processing pipeline while more critical 19 applications sit idle pending assignment. Because staff time is at such a premium, a four-level category designation, with very clear guidelines, should be established. For example, a level one application would require immediate attention both because of the technology involved, and the status of the end-user/purchaser. 67 Each application would note which category it fits within, citing the criteria satisfied for inclusion in the category.
Coupled with the new category designations should be a set of mandatory processing timelines, which would vary based on the category level. One of the biggest problems with the current USML export system is that exporters have no certainty as to how long the application process will take. This makes commercial transactions extremely difficult. Mandatory processing times would solve this issue. The U.S. currently sells prior generation weapons and communications systems around the world. There is no reason that a pre-approval process could not be implemented that would rapidly speed the export of major commercial systems for all but the most advanced systems.
Permit Expanded, Pre-Approved Licensing Of Prior Generation Commercial Satellite Technology
Satellite technology and manufacturing processes that are currently available to, or in use by, foreign competitors are not treated any differently (more leniently) than cutting-edge, U.S.-only technology. This standard puts U.S. manufacturers at a decided economic disadvantage. If a commercial satellite customer (foreign or domestic) can buy the same or similar technology from a foreign source, at equivalent or better pricing, without the uncertainty created by ITAR review and approval, why would they buy from a U.S. source? The answer is simply that they will not. 69 Any technology that is currently in commercial use by foreign entities, available for commercial sale by foreign entities, or is prior generation technology compared to the current U.S. technology, (in other words, is fungible technology) should be immediately placed on a list of "readily marketable technology" that would not be listed on the USML and would be subject only to EAR review and approval.
Conculsion
Space systems and space technology are essential to the nation's security and a key element of the U.S. National Space Policy and the U.S. National Security Strategy.
The Department of Defense and the national intelligence agencies are highly reliant upon information gathered and transmitted through space-based assets, both commercial and military. The current war fighting doctrine, network centric warfare, is absolutely dependent upon satellite communications technology. As the U.S.
commercial satellite market share continues to erode, however, the U.S. risks losing technical dominance. Unless the U.S. export control system generally, and the ITAR specifically, are radically and quickly modified, the nations' security will continue to needlessly be at risk. 2 The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a) and 2794 (7)) provides that the President shall designate the articles and services deemed to be defense articles and defense services. The items so designated constitute the United States Munitions List (USML) and are set forth in part 121 of the ITAR.
3 Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles and defense services. 4 22 U.S.C. 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the authority to control the export of defense articles and services, and charges the President to exercise this authority. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), implements this authority. Executive Order 11958, as amended, delegated this statutory authority to the Secretary of State. 5 The United States Munitions List (USML) is set forth at Sections 38 and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act and can be reviewed at Part 121 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
